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"NONPREFERENTIAL" AID TO RELIGION: A FALSE
CLAIM ABOUT ORIGINAL INTENT
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*
Professor Kurland usefully reviews the framing of the religion
clauses and draws some of the lessons that emerge from that re-
view.' What he says about the first amendment is so sensible and
so studiously noncontroversial that one can hardly disagree with it.
He greatly overstates his casual assertion that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment did not intend to apply the Bill of Rights
to the states, but I have discussed that elsewhere. 2
Consequently, I will have little to say about his Article as such.
Instead, I will build on his Article to examine a recurring contro-
versy about the meaning of the establishment clause. I will draw
on Professor Kurland's Article, on a useful new book by Thomas
Curry,3 and on my own review of the relevant history. This history
refutes one important claim about the establishment clause-that
the Framers specifically intended to permit government aid to reli-
gion so long as that aid does not prefer one religion over others.
* Fulbright and Jaworski Professor of Law, University of Texas. I am grateful to the
participants in the William and Mary Bill of Rights Symposium, and to Sanford Levinson,
David Little, Bruce Mann, L.A. Powe, David Rabban, Teresa Sullivan, and Mark Yudof for
helpful comments.
1. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 839 (1986).
2. Compare id. at 842-43 with Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of
Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 Tsx. L. REV. 343, 347-48, 377 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Laycock, Constitutions]. For analyses of the special problems of incorporating the establish-
ment clause, see L. LEvy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 167-71 (1986); Laycock, A Survey of
Religious Liberty, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 409, 415-16 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Laycock, Reli-
gious Liberty]; Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1386
n.106 (1981). For evidence of express congressional intention to incorporate the Bill of
Rights into the fourteenth amendment, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 22-30 (1980); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (remarks
of Sen. Howard).
3. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
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The theory that the establishment clause forbids only preferen-
tial aid has long been a favorite of those who support government
aid to religion. It does not go away despite repeated rejection by
the United States Supreme Court.4 In the round of establishment
clause debate triggered by the political coalition that elected Ron-
ald Reagan to the Presidency, the "no preference" argument has
been stated in one form or another by Attorney General Edwin
Meese,5 Chief Justice William Rehnquist,' political scientists
Michael Malbin7 and Robert Cord,8 law professor Rodney Smith,9
and my former student, Martin Nussbaum.1° Malbin's pamphlet
and Cord's book have become standard authorities for supporters
of government aid to religion.
Professor Tushnet's prediction that Cord would be ignored1 was
erroneous. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree
cites Cord,'12 and Justice White's dissent was receptive.' 3 Justice
Rehnquist's dissent drew heavily on Cord's history without citing
it.' 4 Justice Stevens' opinion for the majority rejected Justice
Rehnquist's conclusions on the basis of precedent, 15 but it did not
refute Justice Rehnquist's account of history.'
4. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1963); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211
(1948).
5. Meese, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 2 BENCHMARK 1, 5 (1986).
6. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1978).
8. R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION
(1982); Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the
First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (1986).
9. Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back On Again: A Reexamination of the
History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of
the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569 (1984).
10. Nussbaum, A Garment for the Naked Public Square: Nurturing American Public
Theology, 16 CUM. L. REV. 53, 62, 68, 74 (1985); Comment, Mueller v. Allen: Tuition Tax
Relief and the Original Intent, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 566-77 (1984).
11. Tushnet, Book Review, 45 LA. L. REV. 175, 175, 178 (1984).
12. 472 U.S. 38, 79 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. See id. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 92-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 52-55 (opinion of the Court).
16. While this Comment was in press, Professor Leonard Levy published a book rejecting
the nonpreferentialist thesis for reasons that are only partly consistent with the reasons
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The prominence and longevity of the nonpreferential aid theory
is remarkable in light of the weak evidence supporting it and the
quite strong evidence against it. I do not mean to overstate what
we know about the establishment clause. Neither its history nor its
text offers us a single unambiguous meaning. But they can elimi-
nate some possible meanings, and to do that is real progress. 17 So
long as the debate is dominated by a false claim, it is hard to dis-
cuss the real issues.
In challenging a politically important claim and labeling it as
false, I am self-consciously facing the dangers Professor Kurland
highlighted when he quoted Judge Hand's metaphor of Martin Lu-
ther and Erasmus. 8 The dangers are real, but the point is over-
stated. The force of the metaphor derives from the fallacy of the
excluded middle. Scholars may contribute their knowledge or in-
sight to public debate on important issues. They may contribute it
in a form that is understandable to a policymaker, or even to the
public, consistently with their duty of rigorous intellectual honesty.
Scholars should not feel constrained to publish only turgid prose in
obscure journals. They should not leave the public debate to those
who feel no scruples whatever to conform their claims to the evi-
dence. Even an Erasmus may speak to the press, testify to a con-
gressional committee, or state a carefully considered claim in force-
ful language.
I. THE NONPREFERENTIAL AID CLAIM
There are several versions of the nonpreferential aid argument,
but all reach substantially the same conclusion. The claim is that
the framers of the religion clauses intended a specific meaning with
respect to the problems now treated under the establishment
clause: government may not prefer one religion over others, but it
may aid all religions evenhandedly. Under this view, the Supreme
advanced here. L. LEVY, supra note 2. I will not attempt to fully incorporate references to
his book, but I will note our most significant disagreements.
17. See Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 828
(1982).
18. Kurland, supra note 1, at 839-40 (quoting L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 138 (I.
Dilliard 3d ed. 1974)).
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Court's more expansive interpretation is a usurpation that remains
illegitimate no matter how long the Court adheres to it.
This claim is false. The framers of the religion clauses certainly
did not consciously intend to permit nonpreferential aid, and those
of them who thought about the question probably intended to for-
bid it. In fact, substantial evidence suggests that the Framers ex-
pressly considered the question and that they believed that non-
preferential aid would establish religion. To assert the opposite as
historical fact, and to charge the Supreme Court with usurpation
without acknowledging the substantial evidence that supports the
Court's position, is to mislead the American people.
The fact is that the First Congress repeatedly rejected versions
of the establishment clause that would have permitted nonprefer-
ential aid,'9 and nothing in the sparse legislative history gives
much support to the view that the Framers intended to permit
nonpreferential aid.20 Proposals for nonpreferential financial aid
were squarely rejected in Maryland and Virginia in 1785 and 1786,
amidst much public debate.2 1 No state offered nonpreferential aid
to churches, and only Maryland and Virginia seriously proposed
such aid.22 Some of the New England states provided financial aid
to more than one church, but these systems were preferential in
practice and were the source of bitter religious strife.2 3 There is no
evidence that those schemes were the model for the establishment
clause.
The Framers also had a second, less considered intention. Both
the states and the federal government openly endorsed Protestant-
ism and provided a variety of preferential, nonfinancial aid to
Protestants. This aid was wholly noncontroversial, because the na-
tion was so uniformly Protestant and hostile to other faiths.24 The
early preference for Protestantism is not a precedent for nonpref-
erential aid, and it is not an attractive model for establishment
clause interpretation. The Framers' generation thought about es-
tablishment clause issues in the context of financial aid; they did
19. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 101-23 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
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not think about those issues in connection with nonfinancial aid.2 5
We can make better sense of the establishment clause if we follow
what the Framers did when they were thinking about establish-
ment. Thus, to the extent that the Framers' intent is thought to
matter, the relevant intent is their analysis of financial aid to
churches.
II. THE BEST EVIDENCE OF THE FRAMERS' INTENT: THE TEXT OF
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Rejected Drafts
Professor Kurland mentions in passing the most important fact
concealed by the proponents of nonpreferential aid: the First Con-
gress considered and rejected at least four drafts of the establish-
ment clause that explicitly stated the "no preference" view.2 6 So
far as we can tell from the legislative journal, the issue was
squarely posed in the Senate and again in the Conference
Committee.
The House of Representatives sent to the Senate a draft of the
establishment clause somewhat like the version ultimately ratified:
Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed.27
The first motion in the Senate clearly presented the "no prefer-
ence" position. The motion was to strike out "religion, or
25. See infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
26. See Kurland, supra note 1, at 855.
27. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 159, 166 (House Journal) (L. de Pauw ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY]; 1 id. at 136 (Senate Journal). The draft quoted in text is from the House Journal
for August 21, 1789 and the engrossed bill transmitted to the Senate on August 24. The
version quoted in the Annals of Congress is slightly different: "Congress shall make no law
establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of con-
science." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 20, 1789). The two discrepancies,
in the free exercise and rights of conscience clauses, do not appear to affect meaning. They
may have resulted from a mistranscription in the Annals, from an amendment on August 21
not reported in the Annals, or from an editorial change or mistranscription in preparing the
final copy of the bill. Any error occurred in the House and does not affect the significance of
the motion in the Senate.
Different printings of the Annals of Congress have different pagination; the date is the
surest way to find particular passages. M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 6 n.21.
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof," and to insert, "one religious
sect or society in preference to others."28 The motion was first re-
jected, and then passed.29 The proposal on the floor then read:
Congress shall make no law establishing one religious sect or so-
ciety in preference to others, nor shall the rights of conscience
be infringed.30
Next, the Senate rejected two substantively similar substitutes.
First, the Senate rejected language providing:
Congress shall not make any law, infringing the rights of con-
science, or establishing any Religious Sect or Society.3 1
Second, it rejected an alternative that stated:
Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomi-
nation of religion in preference to another, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed.2
The two motions to amend by substitution appear to have
presented stylistic choices. But the first vote appears to have been
substantive. At the very least, these three drafts show that if the
First Congress intended to forbid only preferential establishments,
its failure to do so explicitly was not for want of acceptable word-
ing. The Senate had before it three very clear and felicitous ways
of making the point.
Still later the same day, the Senate appears to have abandoned
the "no preference" position. It adopted a draft that spoke of all
religion generically:
28. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 151 (Senate Journal). This motion
also deleted the free exercise clause, but that deletion does not seriously affect the analysis.
The Senate also voted on two nonpreferential drafts that included the free exercise clause.
See infra notes 32 & 34 and accompanying text. The two issues were ultimately separated,
the free exercise clause was adopted, and the nonpreferential drafts of the establishment
clause were rejected. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.3
A week later, the Senate again changed its mind and adopted the
narrowest version of the establishment clause considered by either
House:
Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a
mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of
religion .... 3
The House of Representatives rejected this version. James
Madison and two others represented the House on the Conference
Committee35 that produced the version of the establishment clause
ultimately ratified:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .... 3
The establishment clause actually adopted is one of the broadest
versions considered by either House. It forbids not only establish-
ments, but also any law respecting or relating to an establish-
ment.3 7 Most important, it forbids any law respecting an establish-
ment of "religion." It does not say "a religion," "a national
religion," "one sect or society," or "any particular denomination of
religion." It is religion generically that may not be established.
Malbin is a major proponent of the "no preference" position.
While parsing the legislative history for support of his position, he
argues that there is a big difference between establishing "a
33. Id.
34. Id. at 166.
35. See id. at 181.
36. U.S. CONsT. amend. I; 3 DocusmrErARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 228 (House Jour-
nal). There is a mistranscription in the Annals of Congress, substituting "a" for "the"
before "free exercise." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 913 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Sept. 24, 1789).
37. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). One effect of forbidding any law
"respecting" an establishment is that a statute requiring a state to disestablish religion
would have violated the establishment clause. I assume that the drafters understood this,
but I have seen little direct evidence that anyone feared such a statute or had a specific
purpose to prevent it. For textual arguments that the clause protected state establishments,
see W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 9-10 (1964); Snee, Religious Disestab-
lishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371, 379-89. For an unex-
plained assertion that these arguments are "historically unconvincing," see M. HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 22-23 (1965).
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religion" and establishing "religion." He notes that to forbid estab-
lishment of "a religion" would clearly state the nonpreferentialist
position, but that to forbid establishment of "religion" would not.3 8
On that point, he is absolutely right. The rejected drafts pose the
distinction even more clearly: establishing "religion" is not the
same as establishing one sect or society, any particular denomina-
tion, or articles of faith and a mode of worship. If Congress paid
any attention at all to the language it fought over, it rejected the
"no preference" view.
The nonpreferentialists tend not to mention the rejected drafts,
or to pass over the drafts as insignificant.3 9 Some nonpreferential-
ists rely heavily on similar resolutions from the state ratifying con-
ventions.40 The Virginia, North Carolina and New York, conven-
tions proposed establishment clauses similar to the rejected Senate
drafts.41 James Madison's original bill in the First Congress pro-
vided: "nor shall any national religion be established. ' 42 Like the
Senate drafts, however, all of these proposals were rejected.
An approach to interpretation that disregards the ratified
amendment and derives meaning exclusively from rejected propos-
als is strange indeed. The "no preference" position requires a pre-
mise that the Framers were extraordinarily bad drafters-that
they believed one thing but adopted language that said something
38. M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 8.
39. R. CORD, supra note 8, at 8-9; M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 12-13. Smith speculates
that the Senate drafts were rejected only because they would have permitted aid to a coali-
tion of two or more religions in preference to the rest. Smith, supra note 9, at 614. Reasona-
ble construction would have avoided that absurd result; a simple amendment would have
eliminated any risk. For example, the first Senate draft could have been amended to pro-
vide: "Congress shall make no law establishing one or more religious sects or societies in
preference to others." Smith's speculation does not dispel the inference that arises from
rejection of all drafts written in nonpreferentialist terms.
40. See R. CORD, supra note 8, at 6-7; Cord, supra note 8, at 136-37; Comment, supra
note 10, at 570-71.
41. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 659 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (Virginia) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES];
4 id. at 244 (North Carolina); 1 id. at 328 (New York). The similar proposal from Rhode
Island, 1 id. at 334, came too late to influence the text of the first amendment.
42. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789). A committee of Maryland's
ratifying convention considered and rejected a similar proposal. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 41, at 552-53. For analysis of Madison's puzzling language, see infra notes 85-95 and
accompanying text.
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substantially different, and that they did so after repeatedly at-
tending to the choice of language.
Perhaps the Framers did not understand what they were doing
and viewed the textual choices as stylistic.4 3 All sorts of things be-
come possible once one begins to speculate about what the Fram-
ers might have thought instead of giving primary weight to what
they enacted. But responsible constitutional interpretation does
not allow us to assume a mistake of this magnitude. When the rec-
ord reflects a textual choice as clear as this one, only extraordina-
rily clear contrary evidence should persuade us not to follow the
text.
44
This conclusion is bolstered by the Framers' own textualism.
The Senate met in secret and did not record its debates; 45 obvi-
ously, future generations were not intended to look to those de-
bates for interpretive guidance. Jefferson Powell has shown that
the Framers' generation thought it illegitimate to refer to legisla-
tive history even when it was known.46 They applied to the Consti-
tution the prevailing common law methods of interpreting statutes,
contracts, and other operative legal texts. These methods looked to
the objective meaning of the words in light of the evil addressed
and the remedy proposed. References to "intention" usually meant
the objective intention of the document as revealed by these meth-
ods; the subjective intention of the drafter or the members of the
adopting body was deemed irrelevant. These findings present an
extraordinary problem for intentionalists. If the intention of the
Framers is binding, we cannot look to evidence that the Framers
intended us to disregard and that they considered irrelevant to a
proper understanding of their intention. At the very least, the in-
tentionalists have the burden of explaining why they can disregard
the Framers' own understanding of their intention.
43. This possibility is considered more thoroughly infra notes 149-65 and accompanying
text.
44. For a full statement of my commitment to textualism, see Laycock, Constitutions,
supra note 2; see also Schauer, supra note 17, at 804-12 (rejecting interpretation of constitu-
tional language within the "intentional paradigm," focusing on the perceived intent of the
drafters at the expense of clear textual meaning).
45. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (ed. note).
46. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985).
47. At one point, Powell quotes Madison as rejecting reliance on the Convention's re-
jection of an alternative draft. Id. at 921. Whether Madison meant that the particular
1986] 883
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B. The Malbin Interpretation
Some nonpreferentialists offer a figleaf of textual argument to go
with their intent argument. To Malbin and Cord, the key textual
choice is that the ratified version forbids any law respecting "an
establishment of religion," as distinguished from a hypothetical
draft forbidding any law respecting "the establishment of reli-
gion."' 48 Malbin, who invented the argument, says: "[B]y choosing
'an establishment' over 'the establishment,' [the Framers] were
showing that they wanted to prohibit only those official activities
that tended to promote the interests of one or another particular
sect. e49 The only reason he offers for this claim is that "the estab-
lishment" "would have emphasized the generic word 'religion.'-5o
Malbin's argument is frivolous, and Cord's repetition does not
make it any stronger. The argument is wrong for at least four rea-
sons. First, and most important, the repeated rejection of clear lan-
guage that would have stated Malbin's position overwhelms the at-
tenuated inference he draws from the choice of "an" over "the."
Second, Malbin assumes that the article in front of one
noun-"establishment"-critically changes the meaning of a differ-
ent noun-"religion." Recall that Malbin himself argues that put-
ting even an indefinite article in front of "religion" would have
clearly made his point.51 Third, there is no evidence whatever that
anyone thought of Malbin's hypothesized alternate draft or con-
sciously chose "an" over "the."
Fourth, "an" is perfectly consistent with the view that the
amendment forbids any kind of establishment, including multi-
ple or nonpreferential establishments. "The" establishment
might have connoted that only one kind of establishment is
inference drawn from that vote was unreliable, or that a comparison between what was
adopted to what was rejected is always illegitimate, is unclear. If the latter view were widely
shared, an intentionalist would have great difficulty justifying consideration of the rejected
drafts. A textualist would have much less difficulty. Text that was voted on by the body
empowered to act is a more reliable source of meaning than thoughts and statements of
individual members.
48. R. CORD, supra note 8, at 11-12 (quoting M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 14). For a simi-
lar argument, see Smith, supra note 9, at 618.
49. M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 14 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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possible-perhaps the English kind. "An" establishment more
clearly communicates that any establishment-any kind of estab-
lishment-is forbidden. I would not put much weight on that argu-
ment, but it is more plausible than Malbin's. My inference from
"an" at least depends on the word's effect on the noun it modifies.
I do not insist that the Framers used "an" for the reason I suggest.
But the possibility that they used it for my reason further reduces
the likelihood that they used it for Malbin's less plausible reason.
III. THE DEBATE IN THE FIRST CONGRESS
A. The Relevance of the Debate
The nonpreferentialists rely heavily on the debate in the First
Congress,52 but that debate adds little to current understanding.
The only recorded debate occurred in the House. No verbatim rec-
ord exists, the reporter's notes are incomplete and sometimes inac-
curate, 53 and the notes fill slightly less than two columns in the
Annals of Congress.5 4 Because the Senate met in secret,55 only the
Journal entries recording its votes are available. Thus, the attempt
to override the evidence of the rejected drafts depends on those
two columns of notes from the House. The nonpreferentialists rely
on a puzzling statement by Madison that is probably wrong and in
any event does not state the nonpreferentialist understanding of
the clause. They also rely on attenuated inferences from the re-
marks of others. These remarks must be examined in light of the
preliminary draft to which they referred.
The House debate occurred on August 15, 1789, before any of
the events in the Senate. The debate concerned the draft submit-
ted by a Select Committee, a draft somewhat narrower than the
amendment ultimately adopted. Two things about this draft are
important. First, it was ambiguous concerning nonpreferential aid.
52. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 93-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); R. CORD,
supra note 8, at 9-10; M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 6-11; Smith, supra note 9, at 608-17;
Comment, supra note 10, at 572-73.
53. Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the First Federal Congress, 18 WM. & MARY Q.
519 (3d ser. 1961). Madison wrote that the notes gave "some idea of the discussion," but
that they showed "the strongest evidences of mutilation & perversion, and of the illiteracy
of the Editor." Id. at 532-33 (emphasis in original). See supra notes 27 & 36.
54. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729-31 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
55. Id. at 15 (ed. note).
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Second, and more important, the House promptly rejected this
draft and substituted a version that was not ambiguous on this
issue.
The Select Committee draft provided:
[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed."
The reference to "no religion" is consistent with the view that
many religions exist, and that no one of them may be established
by law. The possibility is best illustrated by comparing the follow-
ing two formulations, which are identical except for the placement
of the negative:
1. No religion shall be established by law.
2. Religion shall not be established by law.
The first formulation is the Select Committee draft. It might mean
that no particular religion, or no specific religion, shall be estab-
lished by law. It is not plausible to read the second formulation
that way; it seems clearly to mean that religion generally shall not
be established by law.
Again, I do not want to make too much of this textual inference.
The first formulation is not unambiguous, especially if it is not
compared to the second formulation. If the Select Committee
meant to say "no particular religion," it could have said so. Noth-
ing suggests that anyone thought of the second formulation and
deliberately chose the first formulation instead. Finally, what the
Select Committee draft meant ultimately makes no difference, be-
cause the House did not adopt it and the subsequent Senate and
Conference Committee choices are much less ambiguous. The pos-
sible meaning of the Select Committee draft matters only because
of the emphasis that has been placed on the August 15 debate.
Anyone who thinks that the debate concerning this draft shows an
intention to ban only preferential aid must keep in mind that the
draft might have been so limited, or that some of the speakers
might have so understood it.
56. Id. at 729 (Aug. 15, 1789).
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Even more important, the House rejected the Select Committee
draft at the end of the August 15 debate. Instead, it adopted the
sweeping substitute offered by Mr. Livermore:
Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the
rights of conscience. 57
Any law aiding religion in any way would "touch" religion. Malbin
concedes that the Livermore amendment would have forbidden
nonpreferential aid and even incidental religious effects of secular
programs.58 But the surviving notes of the debate do not mention
that point, and nothing clearly indicates why a majority voted for
the amendment. Livermore's language had been proposed by the
ratifying convention in his home state of New Hampshire, 5 and he
may have been the draftsman.60 Probably no one will ever know
whether he offered the amendment for a substantive reason, out of
state pride, or out of personal pride of authorship.
Malbin speculates that the Antifederalists supported
Livermore's amendment because it was more restrictive than the
Select Committee's draft and, in their view, any restriction on fed-
eral power was good."' I wish I thought he were right, because that
theory devastates the claim that the Framers meant to permit non-
preferential aid. Indeed, a similar claim that the Framers intended
the meaning that most severely limited federal power is a principal
element of Leonard Levy's attack on the nonpreferentialists.
62
Malbin's Antifederalist explanation of the Livermore amendment
suggests that a substantial block of congressmen understood the
restrictive implications of the Livermore amendment and sup-
ported it because of those implications. Malbin's claim that those
who spoke on August 15 wanted to permit nonpreferential aid is
inconsistent with his claim that the House adopted the Livermore
amendment precisely because it forbade nonpreferential aid and
even incidental aid.
57. Id. at 731.
58. M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 10.
59. See 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 41, at 326.
60. See 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 315-16 (1950).
61. M. MALBIN, supra note 7, at 9-11.
62. See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
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Malbin offers his Antifederalist explanation of the Livermore
amendment to show that the House was sparring on collateral is-
sues. That is plainly true of some of the debate, and it further
reduces the importance of the debate .6  To the extent that the
members were really talking about collateral issues, it is that much
more difficult to infer specific intentions about the establishment
clause from their remarks.
The bottom line concerning the Livermore amendment is this: If
the House had the distinction between preferential and nonprefer-
ential aid in mind, its vote for the Livermore amendment was a
vote to forbid nonpreferential aid, and the "no preference" inter-
pretation of the debate must be wrong. If the House did not have
the distinction in mind, the debate cannot speak to the issue. Ei-
ther way, the debate is little help.
B. The Content of the Debate
Fifty-one representatives were present to vote on the Livermore
amendment. 4 Only eight of them said anything the reporter took
down, and few of the eight addressed the meaning of the Select
Committee draft. 5 Mr. Vining suggested transposing the two
clauses.6 Mr. Sherman said that the amendment was unnecessary
because the Constitution conferred no power to establish religion.67
Mr. Carroll responded that the amendment would reassure those
with honest doubts.6 8 Mr. Madison agreed with Mr. Carroll.6 9 Mr.
Livermore offered his substitute without explanation.7 0 These re-
marks do not support any inference about the meaning of the
amendment.
Elbridge Gerry spoke twice. His longer speech concerned a
wholly collateral issue. Madison had suggested clarifying the
amendment by inserting the word "national," and Gerry took the
63. The most obvious example is Elbridge Gerry's speech. See M. MALBIN, supra note 7,
at 10; infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
64. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
65. See id. at 729-31.
66. Id. at 729.
67. Id. at 730.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 731.
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opportunity to denounce the Federalists.71 The opponents of the
Constitution had argued all along that it created a national rather
than a federal government, and Madison seemed to be confirming
the charge. Madison withdrew his motion.72
Gerry's other comment was a suggestion that the amendment
"would read better if it was, that no religious doctrine shall be es-
tablished by law."7 This substitute would have stated a narrow
variant of the nonpreferentialist position, but it does not show the
meaning of the draft under discussion. No one spoke in support of
Gerry's substitute, it was not adopted, and it closely paralleled the
final Senate draft that was rejected in the Conference Committee.
That leaves three speakers for the nonpreferentialists to rely on:
Mr. Sylvester and Mr. Huntington, who appeared to resist the es-
tablishment clause, and Madison, who sponsored it. Sylvester
feared that the Select Committee draft "might . . . have a ten-
dency to abolish religion altogether. 7 4 From this comment some
have argued that Sylvester was friendly to religion and convinced
that religion was dependent on state aid, so that he must have in-
tended not to forbid such aid.7 5 Those inferences are not unreason-
able, but it does not follow that Sylvester wanted to forbid prefer-
ential aid and permit nonpreferential aid. No one knows what kind
of aid Sylvester would have permitted. A fair inference is that Syl-
vester opposed the establishment clause, that he wanted it nar-
rowed in any way possible, and that he would have. supported any
kind of aid he could get. Whatever he thought, no evidence indi-
cates that a majority shared his views. The Select Committee draft
was not changed to accommodate his objection.
Mr. Huntington was the only speaker who endorsed Sylvester's
remarks. Specifically, Huntington feared that the amendment
would render federal courts unable to enforce pledges of money to
the support of churches.7 6 On its face, Huntington's statement
seems to say that the amendment would go too far if it ren-
dered church contracts unenforceable. But context reveals that
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 730.
74. Id. at 729.
75. M. MALmN, supra note 7, at 6-7; Comment, supra note 10, at 572 n.124.
76. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730-31 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
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Huntington probably meant more than that. He offered the exam-
ple of "congregations to the Eastward." These congregations were
presumably in his home state of Connecticut, because Congress
then met in New York. Pledges of money to churches in Connecti-
cut were not voluntary contracts; every citizen was required to pay
a church tax to the church of his choice.7 This scheme of taxation
could be viewed as a form of multiple or nonpreferential establish-
ment, although dissenters viewed it as preferential and oppressive.
However the Connecticut scheme is characterized, Huntington
seems to have said that these taxes should be enforceable in fed-
eral court. Count one vote for financial aid to religion. But like
Sylvester, Huntington probably opposed the clause, and there is no
evidence that the majority shared his views.
The reporter's notes of Huntington's speech continue:
By the charter of Rhode Island, no religion could be estab-
lished by law; he could give a history of the effects of such a
regulation; indeed the people were now enjoying the blessed
fruits of it. He hoped, therefore, the amendment would be made
in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free
exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronize those who
professed no religion at all.78
This passage may contain more than meets the eye. Perhaps Hunt-
ington was serious about the "blessed fruits" of disestablishment
so long as the concept was not taken too far, but more likely his
reference to Rhode Island was sarcastic7 9 and his concluding re-
mark was a request to omit the establishment clause altogether.
Much of the country viewed Rhode Island as radical, libertine, and
unsavory,80 and supporters of establishment thought that disestab-
lishment was an important part of that state's problems.
The remark about patronizing those who professed no religion at
all appears to be a second allusion to disputes in Connecticut
about collection of the church tax from nonbelievers. 8' Connecticut
77. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 180-81.
78. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730-31 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
79. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 203.
80. Id. at 20-21, 91, 112, 183; F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 175-76 (1985).
81. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 203.
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was willing to let each citizen pay the church of his choice, but it
was not willing to exempt nonbelievers altogether. Huntington had
just urged that the federal courts be available for suits to collect
this tax; perhaps he thought that a refusal to collect the tax from
those who did not pay voluntarily would "patronize those who pro-
fessed no religion at all." References to the rights of conscience
and to free exercise already had appeared in various drafts of the
religion clauses . 2 Huntington appears to have urged Congress to
adopt the rights of conscience and free exercise clauses and to re-
ject the establishment clause.
Nussbaum and Smith apparently conclude that Huntington au-
thoritatively explained the establishment clause. 3 But Huntington
was probably an opponent of disestablishment, or at best a grudg-
ing supporter. His view that the clause should be construed nar-
rowly is based on his preference for establishment. The clause was
not changed to eliminate Huntington's fears. Further, as Professor
Kurland mentions, the Constitution already patronized nonbe-
lievers in an important way: the test oath clause made them eligi-
ble for federal office. 4 Huntington probably thought the ban on
test oaths was a bad idea too, but that is no reason to construe the
test oath clause to require belief in God. It is no more plausible to
impute Huntington's views of the establishment clause to the
majority.
The heart of the argument is Madison's puzzling comments
about a national religion and compelled worship. Madison's tactic
was not to argue with Sylvester and Huntington, but to reassure
them and their sympathizers by portraying the establishment
clause in the narrowest possible light.
Madison spoke twice. The first time, he obviously was respond-
ing to Sylvester's fear that the amendment might abolish religion
82. The draft under debate protected "the equal rights of conscience." 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
729 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789). The Virginia Declaration of Rights contained a free
exercise clause, see 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 303 (quoting the clause), and Virginia's
ratifying convention also had proposed an amendment containing a free exercise clause, see
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 41, at 659 (quoting the proposed amendment). The first
recorded congressional draft containing the phrase "free exercise" appeared on Aug. 20,
1789. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 20, 1789).
83. Smith, supra note 9, at 611, 613; Comment, supra note 10, at 573 n.124.
84. See Kurland, supra note 1, at 845-50, 856.
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altogether: "Mr. MADISON said, he apprehended the meaning of
the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to wor-
ship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." 5 Hunting-
ton responded that he understood the amendment to mean what
Madison had said, but he feared "that the words might be taken in
such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion." '
Huntington then made his speech about collecting Connecticut
church taxes and the blessed fruits of disestablishment in Rhode
Island.
Madison then spoke a second time. He proposed that the House
insert the word "national" before the word "religion," so that the
establishment clause would read: "No national religion shall be es-
tablished by law."'87 Madison explained that
he believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-
eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform. He thought that if
the word "national" was introduced, it would point the amend-
ment directly to the object it was intended to prevent.88
Madison's two statements are obviously inconsistent with mod-
ern interpretations of the establishment clause, but they are
equally inconsistent with the view that only preferential aid is for-
bidden. Almost everyone agrees that the establishment clause
means more than Madison mentioned on August 15.89 If Congress
appropriated one million dollars for the support of the United
Methodist Church, it would not be enforcing the observation of
Methodism by law. Nevertheless, the appropriation would be pref-
erential aid, unconstitutional even under the "no preference" view
of the clause. If Madison's second statement described the entire
meaning of the clause, the later Senate draft forbidding uniform
85. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 731.
88. Id.
89. But compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[Madison] saw the amendment as designed to prohibit ... a national religion, and per-
haps to prevent discrimination among sects." (emphasis added)) with id. at 113 (same two
goals; "perhaps" omitted).
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"articles of faith or a mode of worship" 90 would have captured the
meaning perfectly. But that draft also was rejected.
It is hard to know what Madison was thinking. The two state-
ments are inconsistent with all his previous and subsequent state-
ments concerning establishment.91 Nevertheless, he appears to
have said the same thing clearly and twice, which reduces the risk
that the reporter's notes are materially inaccurate. The statements
also are consistent with Madison's June 8 draft of the clause,
which provided only that no "national religion be established."92
Perhaps Madison was willing to settle for such a narrow amend-
ment if that were all he could get, but subsequent developments in
the Senate and the Conference Committee opened the way to
more. Perhaps he believed that pressure for a single establishment
with compelled observance was the issue most likely to arise, so
that he believed he was accurately describing the principal conse-
quence of the amendment. Perhaps Professor McConnell is right
that coercion rather than preference is the essence of the establish-
ment clause,9 3 and Madison was describing the classic example of
coercion. Perhaps he was dissembling. We will never know. But
Madison plainly did not describe a ban on preferential aid.
Madison's proposal to insert "national" before "religion" would
have strengthened the implication that only a single national es-
tablishment was forbidden. But he promptly withdrew that motion
in the face of Gerry's attack on the word "national. 94 He could
have substituted a less offensive adjective; "particular," "specific,"
or "single" would have done nicely. Either he did not think of
these words or he chose not to offer them. His failure to offer such
alternatives is consistent with Professor Levy's suggestion that the
word "national" was intended to emphasize that the clause bound
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. See THE COMPLETE MADISON: His BASIC WRITINGS 298-312 (S. Padover ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as THE COMPLETE MADISON]. For Madison's reaction to a bill aiding a
particular church without coercing others to conform to it, see id. at 308 (vetoing bill as
unconstitutional).
92. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789).
93. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
933 (1986) [hereinafter cited as McConnell, Coercion]; see McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 20, 35-39 [hereinafter cited as McConnell, Accommodation].
94. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
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only Congress. 5 But even if Levy's suggestion explains Madison's
attempt to insert "national" into the text of the clause, it does not
account for Madison's narrow explanations of the meaning of the
clause.
After Madison withdrew his amendment, someone called the
question on Livermore's substitute, and the House adopted it.96
The only reported debate thus ended a lot further from the "no
preference" position than it began. Gerry's substitute was ignored,
Madison's amendment was withdrawn, and Livermore's sweeping
substitute was adopted. No one explicitly argued that preferential
establishments were bad while nonpreferential establishments were
acceptable. Two of the remarks most relied on by nonpreferential-
ists came from apparent opponents of the clause, and neither they
nor Madison stated the "no preference" position. Compared to the
clear textual choices made in the Senate and in the Conference
Committee, nothing in this brief debate casts any useful light on
the problem.
IV. THE DEBATES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STATES
Independence was an occasion for reviewing church-state rela-
tions in the revolutionary states. 7 In the states with established
Anglican churches, the King was the head of both the church and
the state, and the question of succession extended to both his secu-
lar and his religious authority. 8 Several states wrote constitutions
in the wake of independence, and they addressed church-state
questions in their bills of rights. The ferment concerning this issue
affected churches as well as governments. For example, in 1788 the
95. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 76, 97. The draft did not yet explicitly mention Congress.
See id.
96. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789).
97. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 134.
98. The situation in Virginia exemplified the turmoil that followed independence in these
states. Delegates to the Revolutionary Convention of 1776 ordered all references to King
George III deleted from the liturgy, and ordered prayers for the new civil magistrates in-
stead. T. BUcKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787, at 21 (1977).
These changes created a serious problem of conscience for those Anglican clergy who felt
bound by their ordination oaths to support the Crown and the Book of Common Prayer. Id.
at 43.
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Presbyterians in the United States amended their Confession to
renounce the Calvinist tradition of establishment.99
For obvious reasons, the debates in the states are not direct evi-
dence of the meaning of the federal religion clauses. Nothing in
these debates was offered as an explanation of those clauses, and
the Framers could support one regime of church-state relations for
their respective states and a quite different regime of church-state
relations for the new federal government. At the very least, the
framing of a federal rule required a choice among the diverse prac-
tices in the states. Moreover, as Professor Van Alstyne has pointed
out with respect to the speech clause, the Framers' understanding
of federalism predisposed them to restrict federal power more se-
verely than state power.100
Thus, I do not offer the state debates as legislative history in
anything like the usual sense. Instead, I offer them as intellectual
history. The state debates help show how the concept of establish-
ment was understood in the Framers' generation. Learning how
that generation understood the concept may be more informative
than the brief and unfocused debate in the House. If the Framers
generally understood the concept in a certain way, and if nothing
indicates that they used the word in an unusual sense in the first
amendment, then we can fairly assume that the Framers used the
word in accordance with their general understanding of the
concept.
A. Votes Against Nonpreferential Aid
For several reasons, the debates in Virginia were most impor-
tant. First, the arguments were developed most fully in Virginia.
Second, Madison led the winning coalition, and he played a domi-
nant role in the adoption of the establishment clause three years
later. Third, the debates in Virginia may have been the best
known. I am not sure of that, and the subject deserves further
99. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V, 83-87, 97-99 (1946). For the earlier version, see
CREEDS OF THE CHURCHES 215-16, 219-20 (J. Leith 3d ed. 1982). The evolving views of the
major denominations in Virginia are carefully reviewed in T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98.
100. See Van Alstyne, Congressional Power and Free Speech: Levy's Legacy Revisited
(Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094-99 (1986).
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investigation, but most of the national figures from Virginia were
involved, some in leadership roles on each side. °1' Further, the de-
bate dragged on for ten years. 10 2 It would be surprising if the lead-
ing Virginians had said nothing to their correspondents in other
states. Virginia's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom'03 was
published widely in Europe, 04 and was the subject of at least one
pamphlet published in Philadelphia. 0 5 Curry also notes a Connect-
icut clergyman discoursing on the Virginia debates in 1791. l08
The Virginia fight came to a head in 1785 and 1786. The defend-
ers of establishment offered a compromise known as a general
assessment, under which all Christian churches could receive
tax money and every taxpayer could designate a church to receive
his tax. The bill would have included Catholics, and it tried to
101. Patrick Henry was the principal proponent of financial aid to Christian ministers. T.
CURRY, supra note 3, at 142. George Washington and Richard Henry Lee also took that
position, T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 101-02, 136, but Washington eventually abandoned
the measure on the ground that it had become too divisive, id. at 136; L. LEvY, supra note 2,
at 59. John Marshall, then a young legislator, was defeated for reelection because of his
support for the bill. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 117 n..
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the opponents. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 139,
142. Edmund Randolph also was opposed to the bill. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 124, 129-
30. George Mason drafted the religious liberty clause in the Virginia Declaration of Rights
and the first statute suspending collection of the tax, 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 303-05,
and he circulated Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance for signatures, T. BUCKLEY, supra
note 98, at 147.
Virginia's religious leaders also were actively involved in the dispute, and they attended
national meetings of their denominations during this period. Id. at 117-19, 123, 152 (Angli-
cans); id. at 120 (Methodists); PRESBYTERIAN BOARD OF EDUCATION AND SABBATH-SCHOOL
WORK, RECORDS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1706-1788,
at 514, 528, 542-43 (1969) (Presbyterians).
102. The full ten years are reviewed in T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, and in 1 A. STOKES,
supra note 60, at 366-97.
103. Ch. 34 (1786), 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (1823). The Act also may be found
in T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 190-91, R. CORD, supra note 8, at 249-50, and 1 A. STOKES,
supra note 60, at 392-94.
104. 3 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 688-89 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison, Dec. 16, 1786).
105. J. SWANWICK, CONSIDERATIONS ON AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE OF VIRGINIA, ENTITLED
AN ACr FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Philadelphia 1786), cited in T.
BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 165 n.59. The pamphlet attacked the Act, and in the political
practice of the times, Swanwick's attack should have produced a responsive pamphlet de-
fending the Act.
106. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 182; see also id. at 171 (Massachusetts advocate citing
Virginia law in 1780-81).
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accommodate Quaker and Mennonite objections to paid clergy.07
Any taxpayer could refuse to designate a church, with undesig-
nated church taxes going to a fund for schools.108 These provisions
were substantial improvements over superficially similar systems
in Massachusetts and Connecticut. 09 Supporters of the bill in-
voked the slogan "Equal Right and Equal Liberty," and argued
that it imposed not "the smallest coercion" to contribute to the
support of religion." 0Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments"' was published to rally the citizenry against this non-
preferential establishment. Many similar petitions also were circu-
lated, especially by Presbyterians and Baptists, 12 and support for
establishment collapsed. The assessment bill died without a
vote,"' and the legislature enacted Jefferson's Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom instead. Thus, the great debate about disestab-
lishment in Virginia culminated in a decisive vote against nonpref-
erential aid.
Professors Cord and Smith try to make this choice go away
by showing that Madison considered the general assessment bill
preferential. 114 Madison and others were able to imagine the bill's
107. A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, reprinted in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947) (Appendix to opinion of Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). The bill also may be found in T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 188-89, and R.
CORD, supra note 8, at 242-43.
108. The bill used the phrase "seminaries of learning," which almost certainly meant
schools generally and not just schools for the training of ministers. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 442 (1933) (definition 4 and the examples of usage). Buckley's thorough history
of the controversy treated the provision as unambiguous. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at
108-09, 133.
109. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
110. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 145.
111. Madison, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (circa June 20, 1785) [hereinafter cited as
Memorial and Remonstrance]. The Memorial and Remonstrance has been reprinted widely.
See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting); R. CORD, supra note 8, at 244-49; THE COMPLETE MADISON, supra note
91, at 299-306.
112. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 137-40, 147-52; T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 143-46.
113. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 158 n.45.
114. R. CORD, supra note 8, at 20-21; Cord, supra note 8, at 159-60; Smith, supra note 9,
at 587-95.
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effects on Jews, Muslims, and other non-Christians,"' and
Madison also objected that Quakers and Mennonites were not the
only religious groups that needed or deserved partial exemption."'
Both of these objections tended to show that the proposal was not
quite as nonpreferential as its supporters claimed. Consequently,
according to Professors Cord and Smith, some of the votes against
the bill may have been votes against these preferential features
rather than votes against a pure system of nonpreferential aid.
That is conceivable, but it is wholly unrealistic. It is anachronis-
tic to view aid to all denominations of Christians as preferential in
1786. There were hardly any Jews in the United States at that
time, and no other non-Christians to speak of."7 Indeed, when it
suits his purpose, Cord correctly states that aid to all Christians
was viewed as nonpreferential in the late eighteenth century." 8
That some Virginians could imagine the effects of establishment
on non-Christians only shows how far Virginians had thought
through the problem. No public figure had talked that way since
Roger Williams." 9
The provision for Quakers and Mennonites in the general assess-
ment bill was facially preferential, but it was an attempt to make
the bill less preferential in its impact. The bill would have been
more objectionable without this provision. Madison did not want
115. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 151; T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 145; Memorial and
Remonstrance, supra note 111, 1 3-4. An amendment to include non-Christians had been
tentatively accepted and then rejected in the legislature. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 108.
116. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 111, 4.
117. Stokes reported that the nation's Jewish population did not reach 10,000 until well
after the Revolution, with that small number concentrated largely in Newport, New York
City, Philadelphia, and Charleston. 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 286. He did not cite a
source for these data. Deism among the Framers "usually amounted to a severely stripped
down version of Christianity, with all that smacked of mystery and superstition pared
away." J. TURNER, WITHOUT GOD, WITHOUT CREED: THE ORIGINS OF UNBELIEF IN AMERICA 51-
52 (1985). Most of the prominent Framers maintained membership in some Protestant
church. See 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 293, 299, 302, 306, 310, 311, 314, 333, 339, 350,
353, 507-14. The most notable exceptions were the Roman Catholic Carrolls of Maryland.
See id. at 324.
118. E.g., R. CORD, supra note 8, at 161; Cord, supra note 8, at 138 n.45.
119. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 145, 182. Williams had written of "papists and protes-
tants, Jews and Turks" all on one ship, with complete and equal religious liberty. Letter to
the Town of Providence, reprinted in 1 G. GROB & R. BECK, AMERICAN IDEAS: SOURCE READ-
INGS IN THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (1963).
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the Quakers and Mennonites compelled to conform; he wanted ev-
eryone to be exempt.
Virginians understood the vote against the bill as a rejection of
any form of financial aid to churches. The proof of that is that the
ten-year-old controversy died with this bill. No one at the time
perceived that only preferential aid had been rejected; no one pro-
posed a new bill that included non-Christians and eliminated the
exemptions for Quakers and Mennonites. Instead, the Act for Es-
tablishing Religious Freedom provided that "no man shall be com-
pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or min-
istry whatsoever"' 2 - language comprehensive enough to ban taxes
for either preferential or nonpreferential aid. The Act also declared
that any subsequent bill narrowing its terms would be a violation
of natural right.12'
An equally clear vote occurred in Maryland. Supporters of estab-
lishment there proposed a tax even less preferential than the tax
proposed in Virginia. Non-Christians were exempt, and Christians
could pay either a minister of their choice or a fund for the poor.'22
The proposal was defeated in 1785 after substantial public
debate. 123
The votes in Virginia and Maryland show that whenever a choice
between nonpreferential aid and no aid was squarely posed, Ameri-
cans in the 1780's voted for no aid. When they focused on the
question, they concluded that nonpreferential aid was a form of
establishment and inconsistent with religious liberty.
B. Developments Elsewhere
The debates in other states provide little evidence of a different
understanding. Curry's thorough survey reports little support for
nonpreferential establishment. Georgia did have a nonpreferential
tax on the books, but the tax appears never to have been collected,
120. Ch. 34, 111 (1786), 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 84, 86 (1823).
121. Id. I111, 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 86.
122. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 155-57. The bill may have been proposed as a political
diversion, but the ensuing debate was genuine and robust. See F. McDONALD, supra note 80,
at 43-44.
123. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 156-57.
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and it therefore stirred little debate. 124 Such taxes were prohibited
in the Georgia Constitution of 1798.125
The Anglican establishment in South Carolina was abolished
without substantial controversy. 2 ' The new law was called an es-
tablishment, and its recitals endorsed Protestantism,127 but its sub-
stantive sections merely provided for the incorporation of
churches. 128 Occasional proposals for nonpreferential financial aid
drew no support.1 29
The vestigial Anglican establishments in North Carolina'30 and
New York13 1 were abolished without major controversy. No recog-
nized establishment had ever existed in Pennsylvania, 3 2 Dela-
ware,13 3 New Jersey,23 4 or Rhode Island,13 and thus these states
had nothing to repeal. No one seriously proposed nonpreferential
establishment in any of these six states.
Massachusetts had a system that might arguably be character-
ized as nonpreferential aid.136 It was written into the Constitution
of 1780, amidst considerable debate. Under this system, Massachu-
setts imposed a tax to support the minister elected by each town,
who was nearly always a Congregationalist. Dissenters could file an
exemption certificate and pay the tax to their own minister, at
least in theory. In practice, the Massachusetts system was prefer-
ential, and it fell especially harshly on Quakers and Baptists.
Quakers had no ministers, 3 7 and Baptists conscientiously objected
to supporting their ministers through taxes collected by the
124. Id. at 152-53.
125. See 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 440 ("No person within this State shall ... ever
be obliged to pay tiths, taxes, or any other rate, for the building or repairing any place of
worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to
be right, or hath voluntarily engaged to do.").
126. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 149-51.
127. See 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 432-34 (quoting this lengthy provision).
128. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 150-51.
129. See id. at 149-51.
130. Id. at 151.
131. Id. at 161-62.
132. Id. at 159-60.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 162.
136. See id. at 163-77.
137. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 108; 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 759.
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state.' s Baptists were a substantial minority, and their property
frequently was seized for unpaid church taxes."3 9
The Massachusetts statutes referred to the minister elected by
the majority as the minister "established by law."'140 I think the
system was regarded as a Congregational establishment, with what
the Congregationalists thought was generous toleration for dissent-
ers. It was a deliberate move in the direction of a nonpreferential
multiple establishment, but it does not appear to have been seri-
ously considered nonpreferential. Nor was it a model for the fed-
eral establishment clause. Neither the system nor the controversy
was widely known outside New England. 14'
Connecticut's system was quite similar to the one in Massachu-
setts, and it engendered similar controversies with dissenters
known as Separates." 2 Somewhat similar systems were on the
books in Vermont and New Hampshire, but they were not well de-
veloped and a lot of local variations were tolerated in practice."4
Now add one more fact: Massachusetts and Connecticut did not
ratify the first amendment."4 I do not want to overstate the impor-
tance of this. Failure to ratify need not mean strong opposition;
insufficient support to overcome legislative inertia is the more
likely explanation." 5 Moreover, we have no theory for summing up
the disparate intentions of all the Congressmen and legislators en-
titled to a say in the amendment process.
But one does not need a full-blown theory to show that the un-
derstanding of religious liberty in states that ratified the religion
clauses is more important than the understanding of religious lib-
erty in states that did not. Massachusetts and Connecticut were to
138. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 89-90, 166, 171, 175.
139. Id. at 168. Not surprisingly, many Baptists accommodated to the system, especially
when it worked to their advantage. See L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 30-32, 40.
140. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 173.
141. Id. at 205.
142. See id. at 178-84.
143. See id. at 184-90.
144. Id. at 215. Georgia also failed to ratify the amendment. Id. All three states ratified
the amendment in 1939, L. LEvY, supra note 2, at 85, but by then their understanding of
religious liberty had caught up with the rest of the country.
145. The Massachusetts legislature took some favorable votes on the amendment but
failed to proceed to final passage. Part of the opposition in all three nonratifying states was
based on the view that no amendments were necessary. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 215; L.
LEvy, supra note 2, at 85-86.
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the ratification process what Huntington and Sylvester were to the
House debate:146 probably opposed to disestablishment, and at
least suspicious of it. The existence of systems in Massachusetts
and Connecticut that arguably resembled nonpreferential multiple
establishments reveals little about what the eleven ratifying states
meant by the establishment clause. No evidence suggests that the
Massachusetts and Connecticut systems generally were thought
consistent with disestablishment.
This survey shows that none of the Framers had a working
model of nonpreferential establishment on which to draw. Every
time a nonpreferential establishment had been proposed, it had
been rejected. The allegedly nonpreferential systems in New Eng-
land did not work well and demonstrably caused bitter religious
strife. It is unlikely that out of this background emerged a Con-
gress and a set of state legislatures that specifically intended to
forbid preferential aid and permit nonpreferential aid. A far more
plausible explanation is that the textual choice in the Senate and
the Conference Committee meant what it appears to mean.
V. THE CURRY AND LEVY INTERPRETATIONS
The theses of the important recent books by Thomas Curry147
and Leonard Levy 48 now can be considered. Curry, Levy, and I
agree on the central point: the framers of the establishment clause
had no specific intention to permit nonpreferential aid to religion.
Levy and I agree on the stronger formulation that the Framers in-
tended to forbid such aid. But we take three different positions on
important subsidiary points.
A. The Understanding of the Rejected Drafts
Like the nonpreferentialists, 149 Curry believes that the whole de-
bate was over style. Unlike the nonpreferentialists, he offers a rea-
son for that conclusion. Curry believes that the Framers simply did
not understand the distinction between preferential and nonpref-
146. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
147. T. CURRY, supra note 3.
148. L. LEvy, supra note 2.
149. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:875902
NONPREFERENTIAL AID TO RELIGION
erential establishments. 150 Levy waffles on this issue. At one point,
he argues that the First Congress made a clear choice when it re-
jected nonpreferentialist drafts.151 Later, he seems to endorse
Curry's judgment that the Framers did not recognize the
difference.15 2
The votes in the Senate and the Conference Committee are
equally devastating to the intentionalist supporters of nonprefer-
ential aid under Curry's view or mine. If the Framers had no con-
cept of nonpreferential establishment-if they could not under-
stand the difference between the drafts they were debating, and if
they thought it all a matter of style-they could not possibly have
intended to permit nonpreferential establishments. The Framers
could not have specifically intended something they had never
heard of. If the various drafts all meant the same thing to them,
they are as likely to have intended no aid whatever as to have in-
tended no preferential aid. The only difference between Curry's
view and mine is that I think the Framers did understand the dis-
tinction and that they rejected nonpreferential aid as firmly as
they rejected preferential aid.
Curry is surely right that not all of the Framers understood the
distinction or had it in mind all the time. He shows that some of
the Framers used language loosely or without understanding the
distinction, although not all of his examples support his point. But
he is unpersuasive in his broader claim that the Framers collec-
tively failed to understand the distinction between preferential and
nonpreferential establishments.
As shown above, defenders of establishment often offered alleg-
edly nonpreferential establishments as a compromise. 53 The Con-
gregationalist defenders of the New England establishments regu-
larly contrasted them with the objectionable establishment in
England-an exclusive Anglican establishment.154 The New Eng-
land establishments remained preferential in fact, and the dissent-
ing sects were not satisfied with their treatment, but the idea had
been to make establishment fair to everyone.
150. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 207-15.
151. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 82-84.
152. Id. at 111-14.
153. See supra notes 107-10, 122-23 & 136-43 and accompanying text.
154. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 131-32 (quoting John Adams as an example).
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The Maryland and Virginia proposals would have been much
more effectively nonpreferential, and they had been thoroughly
and recently debated. The 1776 statute that suspended collection
of the Anglican tax in Virginia drew the distinction explicitly. It
recited that the question of a general assessment for all faiths had
aroused a "great variety of opinions" that "cannot now be well ac-
commodated," so that "nothing in this act. . . shall be construed
to affect or influence [that] question ... in any respect
whatever. '155 From 1776 to 1786, the issue in Virginia had been
whether to repeal the Anglican tax or to extend it to all denomina-
tions. It is inconceivable that Madison had forgotten that distinc-
tion. He likely had the distinction in mind when he served on the
Conference Committee that rejected the narrow Senate draft and
substituted the broad language that was ultimately ratified. Many
others familiar with the debates of the 1780's also must have un-
derstood the distinction.
Curry refuses to draw this inference. What chiefly troubles him
is the vocabulary of the debates about general assessments. Curry's
argument contains three interwoven threads, each containing a dif-
ferent mistake.
First, Curry argues that general assessments often were debated
on grounds of religious liberty rather than establishment.156 The
problem with this argument is the equation between religious lib-
erty and free exercise. To subsume both free exercise and estab-
lishment under religious liberty is a perfectly sensible usage and,
as Professor Kurland notes, it was a common usage among the
Framers.1 57 Further, as Curry concedes, the word "establishment"
often was used in debates over general assessments. Madison used
"establish,' ''established," or "establishment" thirteen times in the
155. The provision is reprinted in T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 35, and I A. STOKES,
supra note 60, at 305.
156. Curry says, for example:
Neither side ... attempted to show that a general assessment constituted an
essentially different kind of establishment or to differentiate it from an exclu-
sive state preference for one religion. The parties to the general assessment
dispute concerned themselves with showing whether it violated or did not vio-
late freedom of religion.
T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 210-11. For similar equations of religious liberty and free exer-
cise, see id. at 146, 217.
157. Kurland, supra note 1, at 844.
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Memorial and Remonstrance, and he described the general assess-
ment bill as "the proposed establishment. '158
Second, Curry notes that opponents of general assessment in
Virginia argued that the bill would violate the free exercise clause
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.159 Curry may exaggerate this
point: he is presumably reading "free exercise" every time the op-
ponents said "religious liberty." But the opponents did invoke the
free exercise clause,1 60 and the reason is plain. The Declaration of
Rights did not contain an establishment clause.16 1 The Declaration
and the statute suspending the Anglican tax had been passed in
1776, at the very beginning of the debate about disestablishment.
Together, the Declaration and the statute guaranteed free exercise
and postponed decision on establishment. Advocates of religious
liberty thereafter claimed as much as they could for the free exer-
cise clause; the rhetorical benefits of invoking a constitutional right
were already understood. That rhetorical strategy is entirely con-
sistent with believing that a general assessment would also and pri-
marily be an establishment. Indeed, the 1776 agreement to post-
pone establishment questions would have been illusory if the
parties to the compromise had understood a general assessment to
violate the free exercise clause. 162
Third, Curry concedes that general assessments often were at-
tacked as establishments, but he argues that no one "attempted to
show that a general assessment constituted an essentially different
kind of establishment or to differentiate it from an exclusive state
preference for one religion. 1 63 On the opponents' side, this state-
ment is true and entirely understandable. Their whole claim was
that a tax for all churches is not essentially different from a tax for
one church; they found any church tax objectionable.
158. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 111, 1 9; see also id. 1 6 ("the establish-
ment proposed"); id. T 8 ("the establishment in question").
159. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 146 (quoting Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1 16
(1776), 9 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 109, 111-12 (1821)).
160. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 111, 4, 15; T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at
115, 148-49.
161. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 19 (quoting the provision); 1 A- STOKES, supra
note 60, at 303 (same).
162. For a discussion of the understanding of the relationship between free exercise and
establishment in 1776, see T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 18-19, 22, 115.
163. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 210.
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On the proponents' side, Curry's statement is simply false. Their
whole claim was that a tax for all churches is essentially different
from a tax for one church. Curry's point apparently is that he
found few statements like "We want an establishment but it will
be a different kind of establishment. ' 16 4 That finding is no sur-
prise. Establishments were unpopular, and avoiding any mention
of establishment was rhetorically more effective. Thus, Curry says
the proponents defended their proposals "primarily as fair, equita-
ble, and compatible with religious freedom and concerned them-
selves very little with the issue of establishment."' 6 5 That is ex-
actly how I would make the argument if I were hired as their
media consultant. Note also how Curry's formulation of this argu-
ment again depends on the false equation of religious freedom with
free exercise.
In my judgment, Curry's analysis of the debates ignores the real-
ities of political rhetoric and elevates labels over substance. That
many in the Framers' generation understood the difference be-
tween exclusive and nonpreferential establishments seems as cer-
tain as can be for a proposition about what people were thinking
two hundred years ago. That they understood the language of the
House and Senate drafts as stating the two competing propositions
is less certain. Perhaps they paid no attention to the meaning of
the language, and perhaps they never thought of the most promi-
nent religious liberty issue of the period when they drafted that
language. Those things are possible, but they are not likely.
Equally important in my view, it is illegitimate to assume such
things. If one assumes that the Framers paid no attention to the
meaning of what they wrote and that they were oblivious to the
most prominent issues of their time, the Constitution really can be
read any way at all. That is not a legitimate approach to constitu-
tional interpretation.
B. The Arguments From Federalism
Part of Curry's argument, and a much larger part of Levy's argu-
ment, turns on a mistaken inference from the Framers' concern
164. Id.
165. Id. at 217. The pro-assessment petitions are summarized in T. BUCKLEY, supra note
98, at 113-43.
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with federalism. The starting point for Curry is the position of two
Antifederalist supporters of establishment, Patrick Henry and El-
bridge Gerry. Henry and Gerry are two of Curry's prime examples
of Framers who did not understand the distinction between prefer-
ential and nonpreferential aid. Each of them proposed language
that would have barred only preferential establishments. Curry
finds this inconsistent with their Antifederalism: a ban on all es-
tablishments would have further restricted federal power. He
therefore concludes that Henry and Gerry did not understand the
distinction, and that they intended to bar all establishments even
though their language mentioned only preferential establish-
ments.1 6 Levy makes a similar point about Patrick Henry.1 7
This reliance on Henry and Gerry is an example of a larger back-
ground puzzle about the drafting of the Bill of Rights. The Feder-
alists erroneously believed that the amendments were unnecessary
because the government had no power to do any of these things
anyway. Their error was to focus on the lack of any express power
to restrict speech, establish religion, or violate other liberties, and
to overlook the risk that delegated powers might be exercised in
ways that would accomplish some of the same purposes. 68 Without
the establishment clause, the power to tax and spend for the gen-
eral welfare would authorize a nonpreferential subsidy to religious
organizations. That specific risk probably was not in contemplation
at the time, but the underlying theory that the spending power is
not limited by the enumeration of other legislative powers can be
traced to Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures in
1791.169 When he introduced the Bill of Rights, Madison explained
that even limited powers could be abused, that Congress had dis-
cretion as to means, and that a bill of rights could protect against
abusive measures that might otherwise be necessary and proper
means of implementing delegated powers.1 0
166. See T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 209, 214.
167. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 74, 109-10.
168. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 36.
169. See 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 302-04 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds.
1966); see also United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1936) (adopting Hamilton's view
that power to tax and spend for the general welfare is not limited by enumerated powers).
170. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432-33, 438 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789).
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The Federalist theory was widely believed even though errone-
ous. Under that theory, the amendments were of no substantive
effect. A failure to bar nonpreferential aid in the establishment
clause would not create a power to grant such aid; powers were
conferred only by the original document.
It does not follow that the Framers paid no attention to the con-
tent of the amendments. Whatever the Federalists thought, the
Antifederalists were demanding amendments, and many uncom-
mitted citizens believed amendments were necessary. To build
support for the new government, the Federalists indulged these
fears and agreed to amendments. Thus, the Antifederalists be-
lieved, and the Federalists assumed for the sake of argument, that
the Constitution might somehow confer dangerous powers that
would make the amendments necessary. The amendments were
drafted on that assumption, and any effort to make sense of them
must indulge the same assumption.
Once the Framers set to the task of drafting amendments, the
evidence suggests that they tried to forbid only what they consid-
ered to be abuses. Thus, Huntington was concerned that the estab-
lishment clause not preclude federal jurisdiction over suits to col-
lect state church taxes;' 7 ' he did not notice the complete absence
of any basis for such jurisdiction in article III. Henry and Gerry
proposed language inconsistent with their antifederalism, but quite
consistent with their continued support for some kind of establish-
ment. Henry and Gerry simply proposed for the federal govern-
ment the view of establishment they supported in their own states.
Nothing supports the notion that they did not understand the fa-
miliar language they proposed. Rather, these examples suggest that
when the Framers debated the details of the religion clauses, their
views on religious liberty were more salient than their views on
federalism. 1 2
Levy derives a much broader argument from the relationship be-
tween federalism and establishment. He argues that the federal
government had no power to aid religion and that no one thought
171. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
172. This attention to the merits when debating details coexisted with a willingness to
support or oppose the whole Bill or Rights for the collateral purpose of increasing or reduc-
ing public support for the new Constitution. See L. LEvy, supra note 2, at 87, 108-09.
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the establishment clause created such power. He concludes that
the establishment clause must therefore forbid any aid to religion,
even nonpreferential aid. He finds it inconceivable that the estab-
lishment clause implicitly creates a previously nonexistent power
to grant nonpreferential aid.173
Levy is correct that the clause creates no power, but that is not
the issue. The issue is not what powers the clause creates, but what
powers it forbids. Levy fallaciously assumes that the clause must
forbid any power it does not create, ignoring the possibility that
the clause might be neutral on some things. If no part of the Bill of
Rights were necessary, as the Federalists argued and as Levy in-
sists, then a fortiori it was unnecessary for the prohibitions in the
Bill of Rights to match point for point the powers not created by
the original Constitution.
As I have already argued, the establishment clause was debated
on the assumption that the government may have some power to
aid religion. The Framers fought over how much of that hypotheti-
cal, unspecified, and possibly nonexistent power to restrain. They
could have agreed to forbid or not to forbid nonpreferential aid to
religion, without agreeing, or without having any view at all, on
whether the rest of the Constitution created power to grant non-
preferential aid. The remarks of Henry, Gerry, and Huntington
suggest that the Framers did exactly that. At one point, even Levy
recognizes a long list of federal powers that could be used in aid of
religion.17 4 The Framers foresaw and even exercised some of these
uses of federal power.175 But Levy fails to see how these alternative
sources of power affect his argument.
Certainly the modern nonpreferentialists are not guilty of claim-
ing that the establishment clause creates power to aid religion.
Under modern understandings of the spending power and of exec-
utive and legislative power to issue proclamations, resolutions, and
endorsements, the federal government can aid religion unless the
establishment clause forbids it. Moreover, Levy's argument is
wholly irrelevant to the states. So far as the federal Constitution is
173. See id. at xii, 65-66, 74, 84, 93, 106, 109-10, 114-17.
174. Id. at 172-74.
175. Id. (missionaries to Indians, government land set aside for support of religion, con-
gressional chaplains, Thanksgiving proclamations); see supra notes 168-70 and accompany-
ing text.
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concerned, the states have plenary power to aid religion unless the
establishment clause, applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, forbids it. It is therefore irrelevant to show that the
establishment clause does not create a power to aid religion; Levy
must show that the establishment clause affirmatively forbids such
a power. The two are not the same.
Levy and I agree that the establishment clause affirmatively for-
bids nonpreferential aid to religion, and that the Framers so in-
tended. But I do not think his argument from federalism supports
that conclusion.
C. Levy's View of the Surviving State Establishments
Levy views the establishments in Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Hampshire, and Vermont as multiple rather than exclusive.17 6
He also notes that the constitutions of Maryland, South Carolina,
and Georgia authorized multiple establishments, although he con-
cedes that they were never put into effect.177 Finally, he argues
that the establishment in colonial New York was a multiple estab-
lishment.17 1 He makes these arguments to show that multiple es-
tablishments were part of the Framers' concept of establishment,
and therefore that the establishment clause must have forbidden
multiple as well as exclusive establishments.179 This is a useful re-
sponse to scholars who claim that "establishment" can only mean
an exclusive establishment. i 0
Levy goes further, arguing that these multiple establishments
were also nonpreferential, and therefore that the clause forbids
nonpreferential establishments as well.'' An essential part of this
argument is to elide the distinction between multiple and nonpref-
erential establishments. An establishment can be multiple in the
sense that more than one church gets state support, and also
176. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 15-20, 26-33 (Massachusetts); id. at 20-22, 41-44 (Connecti-
cut); id. at 23-24, 38-40 (New Hampshire); id. at 44-46 (Vermont).
177. Id. at 47.
178. Id. at 10-15. However characterized, this establishment was abolished in 1777. Id. at
26.
179. Id. at 6-9, 61-62.
180. Such a claim appears in J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION 204 (1949), quoted in L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 6.
181. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 61-62, 110.
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preferential in the sense that one church gets more support than
others. Indeed, this is a fair characterization of the New England
establishments on which Levy bases most of his case. New England
dissenters who were willing to take advantage of the coercive
power of the state could get some forms of state aid, through their
power to collect taxes from members who filed exemption certifi-
cates and through their occasional success in electing local minis-
ters.18 2 Thus, Levy concludes, even the dissenters were established.
He is right in a sense, and to that extent these were multiple
rather than exclusive establishments. But they were not nonprefer-
ential establishments. They were enacted by Congregationalist ma-
jorities for their own benefit, and the equality of Congregational-
ists and dissenters remained wholly theoretical.
Levy devotes two chapters to showing that multiple establish-
ments existed in both the colonial and early national period. 8 3 He
devotes only scattered and conclusory passages to showing that
these establishments were nonpreferential. 8 4 Significantly, he has
an index entry for multiple establishments but not for nonprefer-
ential establishments. 8 5 He simply does not distinguish the two
concepts on any sustained basis.
Levy and I agree that New England tried to cover establishment
with a veneer of nonpreferentialism. I believe that he is fooled by
that veneer and by his desire to show that the Framers were famil-
iar with nonpreferential establishments. Levy emphasizes the non-
preferential legal theory of the New England establishments, but
he gives less weight to their oppressive practical operation, which
he blames on unfair administration and the Congregationalist vot-
ing majority. 18  He repeatedly says that Congregationalists benefit-
ted from demography rather than law. i8 7 But the demography was
perfectly understood when the law was enacted and, as Levy
182. Id. at 15-16, 21-22, 28, 30-32, 40.
183. Id. at 1-62.
184. Id. at 20, 28-30, 61-62, 110. At one point, Levy concedes that the establishment in
Connecticut was preferential in fact, though not in theory. Id. at 41. At another point, he
says the Connecticut establishment was nonpreferential. Id. at 22.
185. Id. at 231. At one point, Levy explicitly equates exclusive and preferential establish-
ments. Id. at 62.
186. Id. at 19-20, 31, 40.
187. Id. at 19, 45, 61-62.
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concedes in the case of Massachusetts,8 " the Congregationalists
were the intended beneficiaries of the New England establish-
ments. He agrees that dissenters were often oppressed by the sys-
tem,8  but he never reconciles this reality with his assertions that
the establishment was nonpreferential. Nor does he make any ef-
fort to explain how a system could be nonpreferential when com-
pliance violated the conscientious beliefs of the two largest minor-
ity sects. In general, he elevates form far above substance. 19 0
Levy also equates local option establishments with nonpreferen-
tial establishments. In a system in which each town could elect the
established minister, dissenters were able to win a few towns. Levy
looks at this from a statewide perspective and proclaims it non-
preferential.' But from a local perspective, each town had an ex-
clusive establishment, mitigated only by the exemption available
to local dissenters. And as noted, in a state with a large Congrega-
tionalist majority, Congregationalist dominance of local elections
was foreseen and intended.
Whether the New England establishments were evenhanded
enough to be called nonpreferential is not crucial to either Levy's
argument or mine. The effort to appear nonpreferential, in New
England and elsewhere, shows that the Framers understood the
concept of a nonpreferential establishment. Unlike Levy, I think
an additional step is needed to complete the argument: that when
the Framers squarely focused on the choice between nonpreferen-
tial establishment and no establishment at all, they chose no estab-
lishment at all.19 2
Without that additional step, Levy's characterization of the sur-
viving establishments as nonpreferential can be turned against
him. A nonpreferentialist could respond that the establishment
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at 20-22, 28, 31, 41-42.
190. Commentators on Levy's work on freedom of speech and of the press have criticized
a similar emphasis on the legal theory of seditious libel instead of the practical reality of a
free press. See, e.g., Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 509-
15 (1983); Anderson, Levy vs. Levy (Book Review), 84 MICH. L. REv. 777 (1986); Jensen,
Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REv. 456, 456-57 (1961). For Levy's response, conceding the valid-
ity of the criticism but only in part, see L. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); Levy,
The Legacy Reexamined, 37 STAN. L. REv. 767, 767-70 (1985).
191. L. LEVY, supra note 2, at 15, 29, 38-39, 45.
192. See supra notes 26-51 & 101-23 and accompanying text.
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clause reflects the views of the large number of states that, in
Levy's view, had recently replaced exclusive establishments with
nonpreferential establishments. That response should fail, because
the more direct evidence is to the contrary, and because Levy's
characterization of the New England establishments as nonprefer-
ential is so unconvincing. Surely not even today's nonpreferential-
ists believe that Congress could constitutionally mandate local op-
tion establishments modeled on the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780. However they are characterized, the New England establish-
ments were not the model for what is permitted under the estab-
lishment clause.
VI. THE FRAMERS' OTHER INTENTION: NONFINANCIAL AID TO
RELIGION
The state debates concerning establishment centered on finan-
cial aid. Nonfinancial government support for Protestantism was
rampant and largely noncontroversial. Nonpreferentialists also in-
voke these practices in support of their theory.19 3 Supporters of
government aid to religion also make the more general claim that
the establishment clause does not forbid anything analogous to a
practice that was common in 1791. The creche case"M and espe-
cially the legislative prayer case' 95 are based on that claim.
The argument cannot be merely that anything the Framers did
is constitutional. The unstated premise of that argument is that
the Framers fully thought through everything they did and had
every constitutional principle constantly in mind, so that all their
acts fit together in a great mosaic that is absolutely consistent,
even if modern observers cannot understand the organizing princi-
ple. That is not a plausible premise. Of course the state and federal
establishment clauses did not abruptly end all customs in tension
with their implications. No innovation ever does. Momentum is a
powerful force in human affairs, and the Framers were busy build-
ing a nation and creating a government. Their failure to spend
193. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 99-104 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); R.
CORD, supra note 8, at 23-80; Cord, supra note 8, at 139-48; Smith, supra note 9, at 620-28;
Comment, supra note 10, at 573-74.
194. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-78 (1984).
195. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983).
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time examining every possible establishment clause issue is hardly
surprising. The Framers did not think that everything they did
was constitutional. Professor Kurland quotes Madison's 1787 ob-
servation that many of the state bills of rights were widely vio-
lated.196 Indeed, one of the arguments against the federal Bill of
Rights was that the state bills of rights had been ineffectual. 197
Those who would rely on early government aid to religion must
identify some principled distinction between the practices the
Framers accepted and those they rejected. We can then consider
whether we are bound by, or are willing to adopt for ourselves, the
implicit principle on which they appear to have acted. The search
for patterns requires a brief review of the kinds of aid to religion
that the Framers supported or at least tolerated.
The Constitutional Convention did not appoint a chaplain,9 "
but the First Congress appointed chaplains, and even Madison ap-
parently acquiesced. e99  Presidents Washington, Adams, and
Madison issued Thanksgiving proclamations, 00 although Madison
did so only in time of war and at the request of Congress, and his
proclamations merely invited citizens so disposed to unite their
prayers on a single day.201 President Jefferson refused to issue
Thanksgiving proclamations, believing them to be an establish-
ment.20 2 In retirement, Madison concluded that both the congres-
sional chaplains and the Thanksgiving proclamations had violated
the establishment clause.20 3 He said he had never approved of the
decision to appoint a chaplain.204
196. Kurland, supra note 1, at 852.
197. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439-40 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789) (remarks of Mr.
Madison, conceding the fact but arguing that the federal judiciary would effectively enforce
a federal bill of rights).
198. R. CORD, supra note 8, at 24-25.
199. Id. at 23.
200. Id. at 51-53.
201. Madison issued Thanksgiving proclamations from 1812 to 1815. Id. at 53 n.12. Three
of these proclamations are reprinted in Cord's book, id. at 257-60, and Madison's later ex-
planation of his carefully chosen language also is quoted, id. at 31.
202. Id. at 39-41. There is evidence that Jefferson drafted a Thanksgiving bill for Virginia
during a revision of the Virginia statutes. See Cord, supra note 8, at 135.
203. Fleet, Madison's Detached Memoranda, 3 WM. & MARY Q. 535, 558-62 (3d Ser.
1946).
204. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), quoted in L.
LEvy, supra note 2, at 97.
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Congress also subsidized missionary work among the Indians,20 5
and even Jefferson signed a treaty agreeing to build a church and
supply a Catholic priest in exchange for tribal lands of the Kaskas-
kias.20 8 Congress continued to support sectarian education on In-
dian reservations until 1898.207 Commentators have alleged that
the First Congress reenacted the Northwest Ordinance, with its re-
cital that "religion, morality, and knowledge" are necessary to good
government. 08 The claim is false,20 9 but I do not doubt that a large
majority of the First Congress would have subscribed to the
sentiment.
These examples undoubtedly evidence support for religion, but
they are hard to explain as nonpreferential. Supplying a Catholic
priest to a tribe of Catholic Indians may be a cheap way to buy
land, but it is not a form of nonpreferential aid. A missionary or a
church-run school inevitably represented a particular denomina-
tion, whatever that denomination might be. So did the congres-
sional chaplain. Congress did not hire a chaplain from every faith,
or even one from every faith represented by a Congressman.210 I
assume that most of the Framers saw no constitutional problem
with a chaplain, but I doubt that they rationalized the practice on
the ground that it was nonpreferential.
Professor McConnell's theory that the establishment clause for-
bids only coercive aid to religion 211 comes much closer to explain-
ing the early activities of the federal government. But sectarian ed-
ucation of Indians required tax money, which McConnell agrees is
205. R. CORD, supra note 8, at 53-80, 261-70.
206. The treaty is reprinted in Cord's book. Id. at 261-63. The United States promised to
pay $1000 to build a church, and to pay a priest for seven years. The priest was to "perform
the duties of his office" and also to instruct the tribe's children "in the rudiments of litera-
ture." Id.
207. The practice was ended by the Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62.
208. R. CORD, supra note 8, at 43; T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 218; L. LEVY, supra note 2,
at 172; Smith, supra note 9, at 627-28; Comment, supra note 10, at 574.
209. All that Congress enacted were two technical amendments. Section 1 substituted
"the President of the United States" for all references to "the United States in Congress
assembled." Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 1 Stat. 50, 52-53. Section 2 provided that the
secretary of the territory should perform the duties of the governor in the event of a va-
cancy. Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 53.
210. Congress did hire two chaplains of different denominations and rotated them be-
tween the House and Senate. Cord, supra note 8, at 139-40.
211. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 93.
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coercive. So noncoercion cannot explain everything the government
did either.
The substantial political resistance to establishment focused on
tax support for churches.212 The Framers' generation must have
seen tax support for missionaries to the Indians as different from
tax support for churches. Probably they found missionaries a
cheap and effective way to educate the Indians: they were hiring
churches to provide government services.21 3 Even so, religious
teaching was also an accepted part of the mission, and nobody
talked of any accounting to separate the costs of education in secu-
lar and religious subjects.
Once again, the practice of the states helps to flesh out the pat-
tern. The federal government had limited legislative powers; the
states' general police power gave them more opportunities to act
with respect to religion. Most state constitutions guaranteed reli-
gious liberty. 14 The federal religious liberty clauses did not neces-
sarily mean the same thing as the state religious liberty clauses,
but again state practices may help show how the Framers' genera-
tion understood religious liberty.
State aid to religion was both preferential and coercive. The
states continued practices that no one would defend today. All but
two states had religious qualifications for holding public office,2 15
and at least five states denied full civil rights to Catholics.216 Blas-
phemy was commonly a crime; in Vermont blasphemy against the
Trinity was a capital offense,21 7 although it presumably was not
enforced as such. Observance of the Christian Sabbath was widely
212. See supra notes 107-13, 122-23 & 136-43 and accompanying text.
213. For an application of this analysis to the controversy about "aid" to church-
sponsored schools, see Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 2, at 443-44.
214. For the texts of 12 such religion clauses, see 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 303
(Virginia); id. at 402-03 (North Carolina); id. at 405 (New York); id. at 423-24 (Massachu-
setts); id. at 429 (New Hampshire); id. at 432-34 (South Carolina); id. at 435 (New York); id.
at 437 (Delaware); id. at 438 (Pennsylvania); id. at 440 (Georgia); id. at 440-41 (Vermont);
id. at 442-43 (Rhode Island). For a summary of the Maryland provisions, see id. at 439. The
important Connecticut provisions were statutory; for the text of one of them, see id. at 412.
215. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 162-63, 221; Borden, Federalists, Anti-Federalists, and
Religious Freedom, 21 J. CHURCH & STATE 469 (1979).
216. See 1 A. STOKE S, supra note 60, at 402 (North Carolina); id. at 406 (New York); id.
at 430 (New Hampshire); id. at 435 (New Jersey); id. at 441 (Vermont).
217. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 190.
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enforced,21s with little in the way of fictitious explanations about a
neutrally selected day for families to be together.219 These laws
aroused little controversy, and almost no one thought them incon-
sistent with constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. Yet tax
support for churches was deeply controversial and widely thought
inconsistent with religious liberty.
Several reasons probably contributed to the differing reactions
to financial and nonfinancial aid. First, there is always opposition
to taxes, whatever their purpose. In Virginia, the general assess-
ment was debated at a time of high taxes and low tobacco prices in
a tobacco economy.220 Second, the tax for churches was associated
with earlier unitary establishments: Anglicans in the South, and
Congregationalists in the North. Broadening the tax to include
other denominations did not remove the taint or end the hostil-
ity.221 The Anglican clergy were far more dependent on tax support
than denominations already accustomed to voluntary support.
Third, and perhaps most important, the tax for churches split the
Protestant denominations. Baptists and Quakers objected even to
a nonpreferential system in which every taxpayer designated the
church to receive his tax. When the Virginia Presbyterians reached
the same conclusion in 1786, the assessment bill was doomed.222
For all these reasons, there were widespread objections to tax
support for churches. What is largely the same thing, there were
Protestant objections. This opposition forced the Framers' genera-
tion to think about the tax issue. Once they thought about it, they
concluded that any form of tax support for churches violated reli-
gious liberty. By the time of the first amendment, church taxes
were repealed or moribund outside New England, and they were
not working well in the four New England states that still tried to
collect them.
218. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 484-95 (1961) (separate opinion of Frank-
furter, J.); T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 181-82; Cord, supra note 8, at 135.
219. This and similar secular purposes were the rationale for upholding Sunday closing
laws in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
220. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 153-55.
221. See e.g., id. at 137-38, 151, 175-76; T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 147; id. at 157 (quot-
ing Catholic leader John Carroll).
222. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 98, at 136-39, 143, 175.
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The other government supports of Protestantism never aroused
enough controversy to trigger similar examination. The nation was
overwhelmingly Protestant and hostile to other faiths.223 Bare tol-
erance of other faiths was a major accomplishment, not yet safe
from reaction; accepting other faiths as equals was far in the fu-
ture. John Jay led an unsuccessful movement to banish Catholics
from New York,224 and John Adams boasted that Catholics and
Jacobites were as rare as comets and earthquakes in his hometown
of Braintree.2 s Professor Kurland quotes other examples of Prot-
estant bigotry among political leaders.2 6 Non-Protestants could
practice their religion, but they often could not vote, hold public
office, or publicly criticize Protestantism. Non-Protestants cer-
tainly could not expect the government to refrain from preaching
Protestantism. These conditions would not change easily. Half a
century later, mob violence, church burnings, and deaths would re-
sult when Catholics objected to studying the "Protestant Bible" in
public schools.2 27 The anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant Know Nothing
Party would sweep elections in eight states. 228
In 1791, almost no one thought that government support of
Protestantism was inconsistent with religious liberty, because al-
most no one could imagine a more broadly pluralist state. Protes-
tantism ran so deep among such overwhelming numbers of people
that almost no one could see that his principles on church taxes
223. See, e.g., id. at 181-82; T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 140, 166, 170, 177; F. McDONALD,
supra note 80, at 42-43; Borden, supra note 215, at 472-73, 478, 482. Maryland was a partial
exception; it had begun as a Catholic colony, although it later had an Anglican establish-
ment, T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 153-54, and Catholics were disenfranchised for a time. See
F. McDONALD, supra note 80, at 42-43. A Catholic, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, signed the
Declaration of Independence and served in the first Senate, and his distant relative, Daniel
Carroll, signed the Constitution and served in the first House of Representatives. J. HEN-
NESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 58-59 (1981); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Apr. 13, 1789)
(Charles Carroll seated in the Senate); 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 325 (relationship
between Charles and Daniel). Charles Carroll was well respected nationally, but at least
some political opponents attacked his Catholicism in bigoted terms. J. HENNESEY, supra, at
58-59.
224. T. CURRY, supra note 3, at 162.
225. J. HENNESEY, supra note 223, at 77 (citing 9 J. ADAMS, WORKS 355 (C. Adams ed.
Boston 1856)); see also id. at 62 (quoting Adams' derisive description of a Catholic mass).
226. Kurland, supra note 1, at 847-48.
227. L. LEvY, supra note 2, at 170; 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 830-35.
228. 1 A. STOKES, supra note 60, at 836-37.
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might have implications for other kinds of government support for
religion. The exclusion of non-Protestants from pronouncements of
religious liberty was not nearly so thorough or so cruel as the ex-
clusion of slaves from pronouncements that all men were created
equal, but both blind spots were species of the same genus.
In short, the appeal to the Framers' practice of nonfinancial aid
to religion is an appeal to unreflective bigotry. It does not show
what the Framers meant by disestablishment; it shows what they
did without thinking about establishment at all. I believe that the
relevant intention of the Framers is the one they thought about.
But if that view is rejected-if both the considered and the uncon-
sidered intentions of the Framers are binding-then the result
would not be to approve nonpreferential aid. The Framers' implicit
distinction was between financial aid and other aid. If both their
intentions are followed, all financial aid will be forbidden, whether
or not preferential. But unlimited financial aid will be permitted
even if it is preferential and coercive. Few nonpreferentialists
would defend that.
I am not even suggesting that we modify the principle the Fram-
ers considered. I would apply uniformly the very principle the
Framers considered and accepted: that aid to religion is not saved
by making it nonpreferential.
VII. MAKING SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TODAY
The United States today is more religiously diverse than any-
thing the Framers could have imagined. Waves of immigration
from Europe, Asia, and Latin America have created large and in-
fluential populations of Catholics and Jews, and significant popula-
tions of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, Haitian voodooists, and
others. Geographic concentration and residential segregation make
some of these groups invisible to the majority, but they are numer-
ous and important to many local communities. 22 The Solicitor
General and Supreme Court justices worry about equal treatment
229. For example, the "Yellow Pages" in Honolulu list 50 Buddhist and four Shinto tem-
ples and shrines. They also list one Moslem Mosque, one Baha'i temple, one Church of
Krishna Consciousness, one Church of Scientology, three institutions under the category
"Churches-Cosmology, Ontology, and Metaphysics," and two under the category
"Churches-Spritualism." HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE CO., OAHU YELLOW PAGES 250-56 (1986).
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of Sikhs and Rastafarians.3 0 New sects as disparate as the
Mormons, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Scientologists have de-
veloped indigenously, and imported sects such as Krishna Con-
sciousness and the Unification Church have attracted highly visible
followers. Significant numbers of atheists and agnostics have been
with us since the late nineteenth century; to the Framers, they
were merely a theoretical possibility.231 What does the establish-
ment clause mean in this context?
One approach would be to imitate the Framers' conduct. Under
that approach, all these new religious groups would be expected to
quietly endure state-sponsored Protestantism. The government
would tolerate the new faiths, but they would forever be outsiders
of not quite equal status. Alternatively, we can try to identify an
intelligible principle that makes sense of what the Framers ratified.
I believe that the task of interpretation is to apply the principle of
the establishment clause to the situation that exists today.
A distinction between preferential and nonpreferential aid is not
the principle the Framers intended. Even if it were, that distinc-
tion has become illusory. No aid is nonpreferential. Differences
among Baptists, Quakers, Congregationalists, and Anglicans made
nonpreferential aid unworkable in the eighteenth century. The
vastly greater religious differences today make it vastly more
unworkable.
For the issues that are most controversial, nonpreferential aid is
plainly impossible. No prayer is neutral among all faiths, even if
one makes the mistake of excluding atheists and agnostics from
consideration. 32 On that point, Michael Malbin and I agree.233
Government-sponsored religious symbols or ceremonies, whether in
schools, legislatures, courthouses, or parks, are inherently preferen-
tial. They nearly always support Christianity, and when imple-
mented by their most ardent supporters, they support a particular
strain of evangelical Christianity.
230. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1315-16 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); id.
at 1319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231. See J. TURNER, supra note 117.
232. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 819-21 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. See Constitutional Amendments Relating to School Prayer: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
11, 18-19 (1986) (statement of Dr. Michael Malbin).
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It is theoretically possible to award equal and nonpreferential
financial aid to every religious group, or perhaps to every religious
leader. But the experience of the eighteenth century again suggests
that workability problems are inevitable. And if the debates of the
1780's support any proposition, it is that the Framers opposed gov-
ernment financial support for religion.
Professor McConnell suggests the more workable principle that
the establishment clause bars any aid to religion that coerces
nonbelievers. 234 He sensibly views taxation and school prayer as co-
ercive, s3 5 although the supporters of school prayer disagree. I hope
he would agree that legislative prayer is equally coercive. Adults
may have greater capacity to resist, but the coercion is identical. It
is easier to listen quietly to the government prayer than conspicu-
ously walk out and back in again. I also hope he would view small
expenditures in support of religion as coercive, even though the
taxation required to pay for them is equally small.
Taken seriously, Professor McConnell's coercion test would elim-
inate all government support for religion except endorsements that
cost no money. Crosses and creches would abound on government
property, perhaps paid for by private contributions. Thanksgiving
proclamations, resolutions encouraging church attendance, and
posters of the Ten Commandments 236 would be unobjectionable.
The Great Seal of the United States could be a flaming cross with
the words "in this sign conquer, ' 237 so long as the government only
portrayed Constantine's vision and did not emulate his persecu-
tions..23  Government leaders and media preachers could unite their
efforts to persuade the populace to a particular set of political and
234. McConnell, Coercion, supra note 93, at 938.
235. Id. at 933.
236. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating statute directing
public schools to post the Ten Commandments in classrooms).
237. Cf. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(invalidating similar seal that was prominently displayed on police cars), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 2890 (1986).
238. On the eve of a decisive battle on the banks of the Tiber, Constantine saw a vision of
a flaming cross and the Greek words meaning "in this sign conquer." He consequently or-
dered his troops to mark their shields with crosses, and he put a cross on the army's banner.
W. DURANT, CAESAR AND CHRIST 654 (1944). Constantine won the battle and became the
undisputed emperor, first in the west, id., and later over a reunited empire, id. at 655. As
emperor, he established Christianity and diligently persecuted heretics. Id. at 658, 660, 664.
1986]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
religious views.2 9 These are not happy results, but I share McCon-
nell's view that they are not as bad as coercion, and I suspect that
he would find a theory to constrain some of the most egregious
examples.
I have two problems with his test. First, it allows government to
endorse or prefer one religious faith over others, with the inevita-
ble result that adherents of the others will feel their inferior sta-
tus.240 Second, it makes the two religion clauses redundant. Reli-
gious coercion by the government violates the free exercise clause.
Coercion to observe someone else's religion is as much a free exer-
cise violation as is coercion to abandon my own. If coercion is also
an element of the establishment clause, establishment adds noth-
ing to free exercise.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The principle that best makes sense of the establishment clause
is the principle of the most nearly perfect neutrality toward reli-
gion and among religions. I do not mean neutrality in the formal
sense of a ban on religious classifications,24' but in the substantive
sense of government conduct that insofar as possible neither en-
courages nor discourages religious belief or practice.242 This is the
principle that maximizes religious liberty in a pluralistic society,
and this is the principle that the Framers identified in the context
239. Government officials can do this to some extent in their individual capacity as politi-
cians. I leave to another time the difficult task of distinguishing the personal and official
speech of government officials. See M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983).
240. In his article on accommodation, McConnell says that accommodations must not
favor one form of religious belief over another. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 93,
at 39. But he is reluctant to apply that standard to preferential displays of religious sym-
bols, lest the public sphere be wholly secularized. Id. at 49-50. My understanding of these
passages has been clarified by conversation and correspondence.
241. This is the principle proposed in Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
242. See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (forthcoming). This distinction is
best illustrated by facially neutral laws that violate religious conscience. In Professor Kur-
land's view, a law prohibiting the consumption of alcohol could not contain an exception for
sacramental wine. Such an exception would prefer religion. In my view, an exception would
be required. A law banning wine at the Eucharist and the Seder would prohibit the free
exercise of religion, however neutral its wording and however general its application. In this
example, no compelling interest would justify the prohibition.
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of tax support for churches. They did not substitute nonpreferen-
tial taxes for preferential taxes; they rejected all taxes. They did
not substitute small taxes for large taxes; three pence was as bad
as any larger sum.24 3 The principle was what mattered. With re-
spect to money, religion was to be wholly voluntary. Churches ei-
ther would support themselves or they would not, but the govern-
ment would neither help nor interfere.
That is what disestablishment meant to the Framers in the con-
text in which they thought about it. They applied the principle
only in that context-only to tax support. Their society was so ho-
mogeneous that they had no occasion to think about other kinds of
support. Now that we have thought about it, we are not unfaithful
to the Framers' intent when we apply their principle to analogous
problems. Congress cannot impose civil disabilities on non-
Protestants or ban blasphemy against the Trinity just because the
Framers did it. It is no more able to endorse the predominant reli-
gion just because the Framers did it. Our task is not to perpetuate
the Framers' blind spots, but to implement their vision.
243. Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 111, 3.
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